A firefighter brought a 1983 action in federal court alleging that he was discharged in violation of the First Amendment. The court allowed the case to proceed notwithstanding the fact that the employee was brought up on disciplinary charges, presumably under Civil Service Law Section 75, and was terminated. As the court explained:
Defendants first argue that "the presumption articulated by the Second Circuit in Collins v. New York City Transit Authority precludes [plaintiff] from showing a 'causal connecction'between his protected forms of expression and his discharge." (Defs.' Mem. in Supp. at 8.) In Collins, in the context of analyzing a Title VII employment retaliation case, the court found that "a decision [against the plaintiff] by an independent tribunal that is not itself subject to a claim of bias will attenuate a plaintiff's proof of the…causal link" between the plaintiff's activity and the defendant's purported retaliatory conduct. 305 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2002). Collins goes on to say that "to survive a motion for summary judgment, [plaintiff] must present strong evidence that the decision was wrong as a matter of fact…or that the impartiality of the proceeding was somehow compromised." Id. Relying on Collins, defendants argue that plaintiff's claims must be dismissed because he has not plead facts suggesting that the hearing before Schnirman resulting in his termination was compromised or that Schnirman's decision was wrong as a matter of fact. However, notwithstanding the question of whether Collins applies in the First Amendment retaliation context, it is inapplicable here as that case was decided at the summary judgment stage. Defendants provide no authority suggesting that the Court should apply Collins at the motion to dismiss stage, and as a result, the Court will not consider the hearing outcome in determining whether plaintiff has adequately alleged a causal connection between plaintiff's expression and his discharge.
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