Significantly, even though the Plaintiff's job was not "inherently religious", she held herself out as a spiritual leader and performed many religious functions. That was enough to conclude that the Plaintiff fell within the ministerial exception to Title VII. Therefore, her claim of sex discrimination was dismissed.
In theory, the ministerial exception exists to shield religious employers from discrimination claims that might compromise their freedom to choose religious leaders and teachers. Note that teachers of secular subjects at parochial schools are often allowed to bring Title VII claims if their job function is not essentially religious.
The court described the ministerial exception test as follows:
This is our first occasion to address the 8 doctrine since the Supreme Courtʹs unanimous decision in Hosanna‐Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012) (recognizing a ministerial exception for employment‐discrimination claims). In light of that decision, we conclude that in determining whether the ministerial exception bars an employment‐discrimination claim against a religious organization, the only question is whether the employee qualifies as a ʺministerʺ within the meaning of the exception. See id. at 190‐91. In this regard, Hosanna‐Tabor instructs us to assess a broad array of relevant ʺconsiderations,ʺ including but not limited to (1) the employeeʹs ʺformal title,ʺ (2) ʺthe substance reflected in 17 that title,ʺ (3) the employeeʹs ʺuse of th[e] title,ʺ and (4) ʺthe important religious 18 functions she performed.ʺ Id. at 192.
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